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THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO SUBPOENA MEMBERS
AND DOCUMENTS FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
By

J.

AUSTIN LATIMER*

The promulgation, September 16, 1938, of the Rules of Civil
Procedure for United States District Courts1 is of interest and importance to every lawyer, particularly those who often find themselves in federal courts. As was well stated, the scope of the rules
is designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action. 2 To attempt to single out any rule as of greatest
importance is futile, but for the purpose of this article particular
attention is directed to the rule of discovery. 3 Of course, the lawyer
also will do well to study carefully the new criminal rules, 4 in addition to the rules of discovery in his state courts. This article is
primarily concerned with the much discussed subject of the power
of Congress and the committees thereof to demand documents and
persons from the executive branch of our Federal Government. Before discussing the primary subject, however, what is probably the
most important pronouncement in Rule 34 should be emphasized"upon motion of any party," appearing at the very beginning of
the rule.
Without implying that prior to this rule there was any substantial
difference between the Government when appearing in court as
plaintiff or defendant, and others occupying that position, it cannot
be urged too strongly that when the United States Government (or
a state government for that matter) is either plaintiff or defendant,
the Government is subject to all the rules and regulations applying
thereto. This has nothing to do with the sovereign's immunity from
suit.
The executive branch of the Government has repeatedly claimed
a statutory immunity from the discovery rules, relying on a statute5
*Member of South Carolina Bar Association and Bar Association of the District of Columbia. In active practice in Washington, D. C. since 1941. Formerly Chief Clerk and Counsel, Post Office and Civil Service Committee of the United States Senate; Legal Consultant
to the Chief Counsel, Internal Security Subcommittee, Senate Judiciary Committee, 1954.
Member of bars of District of Columbia, United States Supreme Court, U. S. Court of
Appeals, and South Carolina Courts.

1. Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C.
2072.
2. Scope of Rules, Rule 1.

3. Rules of Civil Procedure, Chap. V. Depositions and Discovery: Rules
26 to 37 inc., 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 34, 2072.
4. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. 3771.
5. REv. STAT. 161; 5 U.S.C. 22.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1955

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [1955], Art. 3
[Vol. 7

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY

granting power to executive agencies to prescribe regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the government of the departments. This
statute, enacted in 1875, was a merger of two groups of statutes, one
dating from 1789, authorizing the heads of newly established agencies
to have the custody of records, etc. pertaining to their official duties;
the other series authorized department heads to make all necessary
rules and regulations for the management of their agencies.
But those who hold that this is an overall immunity statute, overlook the significance of the statement therein, "not inconsistent with
law." The discovery rules are part of the statute law of the United
States. Both the American and British courts hold to the position
that, in court, the Government is to be treated as any other litigant,
or as Judge A. Hand well said :6 "Any other practice would strike
at the personal responsibility of governmental agencies."
If the Government can make the sole decision as to what must be
divulged, this is tantamount to government immunity from discovery
and is calculated not only to work a hardship on the private citizen
but to handicap both the judicial and legislative bodies in securing
from the executive branch information which is necessary in carrying on their duties outlined in the Constitution. No one has more
eagerly resorted to the discovery machinery than the Government. 7
But no one has been more grudging in making it reciprocally available 8 than the Government, which gets rather technical when the nongovernment defendant wants equal treatment. 9
In a series of R.F.C. cases during the Roosevelt administration,
the Supreme Court said:
Executive immunity is but a variant of sovereign immunity,
which is in current disfavor.
Or as Wigmore put it :10
Entrust the administrators with exclusive power to determine
which facts should be divulged and the gate to unlimited extension of the privilege categories is open.
In another case,11 the Supreme Court held that such a privilege
"should be restricted to its narrowest bounds." This case is worthy
6. Bank Line v. United States, 163 F. 2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947).
7. United States v. National City Bank of New York, 40 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.
N.Y. 1941).
8. Yank-wich, Observations on Anti-Trust Procedures,10 F.R.D. 165.
9. Burton v. Weyerhauser Timber Co., 1 F.R.D. 571 (D. Or. 1941).
10. WIGMoon, EVIDXNCX, § 2379 (3rd ed. 1940).
11. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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of careful study as it is something of a landmark on Federal Civil
Rules of Procedure.
Even though the constitutional grant of "all legislative power" to
the Congress does not spell out in detail express powers to compel
disclosures pertinent to the legislative process, such powers are by
necessary implication carried as auxiliary and subordinate to the
original grant. 12 In actual legislative practice, power to secure
needed information has long been treated as an attribute of the power
to legislate, even by the British Parliament and the Colonial legislatures; and a like view has been followed in both Houses of Congress,
and by most of the state legislatures.' 8 Furthermore, a legislative
purpose will be presumed where an investigation is undertaken by
a duly authorized committee, 14 and the scope of the inquiry may be
as broad as this legislative purpose requires. 15
In 1938, legislation was enacted to make it a misdemeanor to wilfully refuse to testify or produce required papers when properly
subpoenaed by Congress. 1 6 To enforce its inherent right better and
to protect those involved, it is clear that Congress intended to impose
on the witness the duty to testify and furnish the subpoenaed documents without resorting to the frequently heard plea of "self-incrimination." 17 But it is worthwhile to look at a very recent statute
on this point which grants immunity from prosecution under certain
conditions in connection with such compulsory testimony or evidence.' 8 This 1954 immunity law amends 18 U.S.C. 3486 and has
special reference to proceedings of an investigatory nature having
to do with treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy
or the overthrow of the Government by force or violence. It makes
mandatory the appearance of the witness and summoned papers. In
this connection the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and
12. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheaton 204 (1821).

13. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
14. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
15. Townsend v. United States, 95 F. 2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1898).
16. "Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority
of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon
any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee . . or
any committee of either House, wilfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not
more than $1,000 nor less than $100, and by imprisonment in a common jail
for not less than one month nor more than twelve months." Revised Statutes
102, c. 594, 52 Stat. 942; 2 U.S.C. 192 (1938). (Derivation: Act Jan. 24,
1857; 11 Stat. 155).
17. REv. STAT. 103; c. 594; 52 Stat. 942; 2 U.S.C. 193 (1938). (Also see
2 U.S.C. 194 as to reporting by Congress to the United States Attorney).
18. Pub. L. No. 600, 83rd Cong. (62 Stat. 833).
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amendments thereto, 19 which legislation, inter alia, has as two important objectives the streamlining and simplifying of committee procedures and the rearrangement of congressional enactments on th6
subject to promote convenience in research, should not be overlooked.
Investigation by Legislative Committees
There can be no argument about the power of Congress to legislate and use committees for that function; but the power of Congress
to investigate and use committees thereof in doing so, raises many
questions since the Constitution does not expressly empower the
Congress to conduct investigations. Is this power implied? Apparently early in our nation's history it was thought so. The highest
Court, speaking through Justice Marshall,20 inter alia, said:
There is nothing in the constitution of the United States which
excludes incidental or implied powers . . . we think the sound

construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the
powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will
enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in
the manner most beneficial to the people.
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court 2 ' held that Congress has the
power to exact testimony from a private individual and compel him to
furnish necessary documentary evidence to a congressional committee.
Sixty years later the same Court22 greatly restricted this broad power,
holding that a legislative body cannot commit for contempt one who is
neither a member nor officer of either House. Although severely
criticized, the ruling in that case controlled for a half century, until
in 1927 the Court announced2 3 that henceforth Congress, when properly exercising its legislative function, may punish a private citizen for
failing to testify in answer to a subpoena of the Senate or House.
The rule that a private party must testify and produce documentary evidence in compliance with a congressional committee subpoena was further strengthened by highest court decisions in three
subsequent cases.24
19. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. (Text of act, 2 U.S.C., sections 31 et al.)
20. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (1819).
21. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheaton 204 (1821).
22. Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
23. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
24. Jurney v. McCracken, 294 U.S. 135 (1934) ; U. S. v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp.
58 (D.D.C. 1947); U. S. v. Fields, 164 F. 2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied,

332 U.S. 851 (1947).
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However, illustrations of refusal by the executive branch to comply with -requests from the legislative and judicial branches for
desired information and testimony are numerous; the instances of
clearcut court decisions on the subject are conspicuous by their complete absence. There are decisions, however, which tend to show
that eventually the highest Court will hold that if legislative committees have such a broad power over individual citizens, that there should
be no immunity on the part of the executive branch unless there is
an expressed or implied constitutional or statutory exemption.
Two cases should be considered on this point.2 5 They hold that
the head of an agency has a definite obligation to respond to court
subpoenas when properly directed to the agency chief and that it is
for the court, not the agency head, to make the final determination
of admissibility, when thus properly presented.
In one of these, the Touhy case, it was held that an F.B.I. agent
was improperly adjudged in contempt for refusing to deliver certain
papers, the delivery of which would have been in violation of rules
and regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. The Court
declined to examine the documents which the agent had brought into
court in response to the subpoena, apparently relying on the agent's
statement that the Attorney General's regulation was controlling. justice Reed held that this case was controlled by the much earlier decision
in the Boske case, wherein a collector of internal revenue was likewise
held in contempt for failing to file copies of a distiller's reports with
his deposition, relying on an order of the Secretary of the Treasury
prohibiting the filing of such except for specified purposes. The collector, jailed for contempt by the state court, was subsequently discharged on a writ of habeas corpus issued by the federal district
court. The Supreme Court's affirmance did not determine what would
have been the decision if the subpoena had been directed to the Secretary of the Treasury as head of the agency. The language of Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Touhy case clearly indicates
that, generally, subpoenas should be directed to the agency head, and
that he should respond in person or through a representative with the
documents.
If the agency head has objections to the submission of the documents, these should be addressed to and considered by the trial judge.
Neither of the above cases grants blanket immunity to the head of an
executive agency nor authorizes him to be the sole judge of the ad25. U. S. ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, Warden, et al, 340 U.S. 462 (1950) ; Boske
v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
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missibility of the evidence. Unquestionably the popular analysis is
that the administrator, be he a Cabinet Officer or not, is in a better
position to determine what should be withheld, particularly when the
question of security is involved. This assumption, however, is somewhat dubious. Failure to respond to a subpoena duces tecum resulting in a refusal to submit the desired documents to the court or congressional committee for a determination as to admissibility, implies
that the judicial and legislative branches cannot be trusted in the same
manner as those of the executive branch; that this high wisdom and
integrity is lodged exclusively in one branch of the Government. This
appears to be a violation of the doctrine of three equal branches of
government. Of course, this argument is not that there should necessarily follow a disclosure in open court or public committee hearings.
If necessary, the trial judge or the chairman and members of the committee can examine the witness and documents privately and withhold
that which should be withheld from both litigants and the-public. To
place sole responsibility for determination of what should be withheld
from the public in one branch of the Government is not within the
spirit of the Constitution.2 6 Nevertheless, what is said on the general
subject may have to bear some modification, especially in this atomic
age. Perhaps atomic energy secrets should be placed in a separate
category; but to safeguard these properly does not require an exception to the general rule, for Congress can and wisely has adopted
special provisions by statutory enactment.2 7
The Power to Subpoena the President of the United States
Although this section is directed to the power of Congress and
committees thereof to issue subpoenas requiring the President to furnish certain documents in his possession, it is not to be inferred
that the courts have less or greater power. More than half of our
Presidents from Washington to Eisenhower 28 - eighteen - have refused such requests. Space will not permit a discussion of all; but
it is well to observe how staunch was our first president's respect
for the separation of powers. In 1796 the House requested President Washington to submit certain executive papers relating to treaty
negotiations with the King of England. The President, in his refusal, inter alia, said:
26. duPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
on by justice Holmes.
27. 42 U.S.C.A. supp. section 1810 (1946).
28. See appendix.
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As it is essential to the due administration of the Government,
that the boundaries fixed by the Constitution between the different departments should be preserved, a just regard to the Constitution and to the duty of my office as to foreign affairs should
likewise be preserved.
This question came up in a broader sense in connection with the
famous treason trial of Vice President Aaron Burr. President Jefferson conceded the power of the judicial branch to issue the subpoena duces tecum but held that he had the right to exercise his
discretion as to withholding certain documents of a highly confidential nature. Chief Justice Marshall, who presided over this circuit
court trial in Richmond with District Judge Cyrus Griffin sitting
with him, declared:
The law does not discriminate between the President and a
private citizen. The President of the United States may be
subpoenaed, and examined as a witness, and required to produce any paper in his possession. Although subject to the
general rules which apply to others. He may have sufficient
motives for declining to produce a particular paper, and those
motives may be such as to restrain the court from enforcing its
production .

. .

. The occasion for demanding it ought to be

very strong and to be fully shown to the court before its production could be insisted on . . . such letters should not, on

light ground, be forced into public view. Yet it is a very serious
thing, if such letter should contain any information material to
the defense, to withhold from the accused the power of making
use of it ....
I do not think the accused ought to be prohibited
from seeing the letter ... or if accused is on trial for his life,

nothing pertinent to his defense, even Presidential papers, should
be denied him.
While the above does not carry the weight of a Supreme Court
decision, the great jurist in a celebrated case 29 was to give such
weight to the separation of powers that this principle is woven into
the warp and woof of our system of government. His philosophy
was that we are governed by a system of law and that the Constitution of the United States is not on a level with statute law, that it
is supreme except as the people alone wish to change it through
constitutional methods.
Just because Washington had sound constitutional authority for
29. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
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his refusal does not mean that Andrew Jackson was warranted in
all of his denials, even though he had the votes in Congress to support
his refusal. During the administration of Buchanan, Congress,
through the Covode investigation, usurped the power that the Constitution had vested in the President, in a proceeding almost as defamatory as that followed later in the impeachment proceedings of Andrew
Johnson. Buchanan simply did not have the necessary strength in
Congress to uphold his right. Just after the battle of Bull Run,
Congress unlawfully took away from Lincoln his power of commander-in-chief and under the Wade Committee, for a time, conducted
the war. A distinction should be drawn between the Wade Committee's action and that of President Truman in connection with the
Pearl Harbor investigation by Congress. In the latter, hostilities
had ceased and the President's restrictive order as to what was to be
given to the committee was a determination by only one branch of
the Government.
The roots of the power of a legislative committee to summon and
,compel witnesses, even a President, to appear and furnish necessary
evidence, lie deep in British as well as American history. Only in
the light of a knowledge of these origins and subsequent developments does it become possible to comprehend its limits. The value
of British precedents, however, has been questioned at times on
the ground that Parliament, as distinguished from Congress, is a
judicial-legislative body. Over a long period (1604-1869) committees
of Parliament were armed with powers to compel the production of
persons and papers, administer oaths, and report recalcitrant and
untruthful witnesses to Parliament. The limited Colonial records
available seem to support this. In 1772 the Massachusetts House
of Representatives said to the governor of that colony, when he was
reluctant to honor the House's request that a certain official appear
and testify, that it was:
:. . not only their privilege but duty to demand of any officer
in the pay and service of this government an account of his
management while in the public employ.
The House got its witness. North Carolina and Pennsylvania took
a similar position with their Colonial governors.
Before leaving the discussion of the power of the legislative branch
to require the President to furnish proper information to the Congress, it should be noted that it would be interesting to consider
what Congress should do if a President refused to comply with the
Constitution which makes mandatory that the chief executive "shall
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from time to time give to the Congress information on the State of
the Union."3 0
The Need for Clarification by the Supreme Court
The primary purpose of a congressional committee, in conducting
hearings and investigations, is to assist in the function of lawmaking,
but there is the secondary important duty of supervision over and
check on the activities of the executive branch.
Also a fact to bear always in mind is that a legislative committee
is an advisory body to the particular House, and a sub-committee
is subordinate to the main committee. The members of the committee do not have authority to act for the committee in an individual
capacity, except certain delegated administrative authority to the
chairman. Therefore, when we speak of the power of congressional
committees, what is really meant is the power that Congress has
delegated to the committee, and nothing more.
It is in the field of legislative supervision of the activities of the
executive branch that delicate questions often arise, among which
might be named:
1. How far can Congress go in demanding information from the
executive branch, when the purpose is not primarily connected
with pending or proposed legislation?
2. What protection is extended to the executive branch and members thereof under the clearly expressed separation of powers
in the Constitution?
These important questions have not, as yet, had a clear and complete answer, but certain precedents and analogies are helpful as a
guide until there is a more definite declaration of the highest Court.
Proper investigations of the executive departments are necessary,
not only because Congress must learn the needs of the agency, but
also because Congress possesses and has consistently exercised the
power to see that the departments are conducted in accordance with
law and policy. The very creation of the office of Comptroller
General is illustrative on this point. When Congress suspects that
irregularities are taking place in a government agency, it is its duty
to investigate promptly and thoroughly. There is ample authority
for such.8 1 Unfortunately, however, the words "legislative power"
are not always self-defining. When the wise political thinkers thought
30. CONSTITUTION o0 THE UNirmD STATES,

Article I, Section 3.

31. CONSTITUTION OV THE UNITED STATSS, Article I, Section 1.
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this through in 1789 and used these in the Constitution, they could
not foresee, nor were they dealing with, new concepts into which
judges of a later date were to pour a meaning disassociated from
past history and experience. "Bred to the bone, as they were, with
English concepts and traditions, a phrase such as'32 'legislative power'
precipitated centuries of parliamentary history."
In 1929 the Supreme Court, while unholding the power of Congress to make inquiry of private citizens, said that "such inquiry
33
This
must be exerted with due regards to the rights of witnesses."
solemn pronouncement should be a warning not only to the trial
judge but to the legislative committee. Nevertheless, this protection
of witnesses is not to say that, when exercising a function that is
proper, the committee is without power even though the investigation may not be directly connected with legislation. The collection
of facts by a congressional committee may cover a wide field and
need not be limited to "securing information precisely and directly
35
bearing on some proposed legislation."' 34 In another case, it was
held that the motive of Congress, or one of its committees, for conducting an investigation may not be scrutinized in a court.
It is clear that the scope of the power of Congress and its committees to conduct investigations of subjects considered by it to be
in the public interest, is limited only to the extent that the purpose
of such investigations must be legitimate, but it is important that
the committee is one acting strictly within the rules provided. The
presence of a quorum at the beginning of the hearing but not at
the time the alleged overt act is committed, will not support a charge
of perjury or contempt. 36 The act must take place before Congress
or a constituted committee thereof.
Over the years debates have taken place in Congress in which it
was asserted that the legislative branch had the right and power to
exact testimony and documents from the executive branch. The
executive branch has replied just as emphatically that such would
be an invasion of the doctrine of the separation of powers. An important pronouncement on this was made in 1941 by the late Justice
Robert Jackson, while he was serving as Attorney General. Just
as the attempt to assert superior power by one branch over another,
32. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of In-

vestigations, 40 H.kRV. L. Rrv. 153 (1926).
33. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
34. United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58 (D. D.C. 1947). Affirmed 167
F. 2d 241 (D. C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
35. Eisler v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 640 (D. D.C. 1948), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 189 (1949).
36. Cliristoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
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advanced in these Congressional debates, is unsound, it seems that
the eminent jurist goes too far in the other direction in denying
unilaterally the power attempted to be asserted. It is believed that
a refusal by the executive branch must be on higher ground than
even the separation of powers.
The Supreme Court has held that a properly constituted committee, like a court, can demand the appearance of a citizen with his
papers. It would seem that the highest Court should extend this
to the executive branch and officers thereof. At least it would clear
the atmosphere if the Court would speak out clearly on this subject.
In a fairly recent case 37 the highest Court had this opportunity. The
defendants were charged with violation of the Sherman Act. They
moved for discovery under Rule 34. In opposing the motion, the
Government maintained that it was "exclusively within the authority of the Attorney General to determine whether such documents"
were subject to this rule. The trial judge directed the Government
to submit the documents, which demand was refused. Whereupon
the court dismissed the complaint. The Government appealed. In a
pe'r curiam opinion, 4 to 4, Mr. Justice Clark not participating because he was the Attorney General in question, the trial court
was sustained. Unfortunately the opinion did not declare clearly
that in such cases the Government is just another litigant and thus
pave the way for the sound extension of this ruling to include proper
demands on the executive from Congress or its constituted committees.
Summary
All legislative power is vested in Congress and the proper exercise of the legislative purpose requires congressional investigation.
This investigation is done through committees which are delegated
the power of Congress for that investigative purpose. As an instrumentality of the Congress, therefore, the committee should be
exceedingly careful to observe correct procedural practices and to
adopt and to follow rules not contrary to those of the body which
gave it its being and not contrary to law.
The rules of discovery are statutory laws. The relation of the
Government in court, so far as these statutory laws are concerned,
is the same as any other litigant. The Constitution does not vest
in either of the three co-ordinate branches any superior power, integrity or trustworthiness. Nor does the doctrine of separation of
37. United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 339 U.S. 940
(1950).
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powers grant immunity per se to any of the three branches, unless
such immunity is expressed or implied in the Constitution or by statute.
The right of the legislative branch to demand and to receive from
the executive branch information and papers pertinent to its legislative purpose is, then, sound. This right has been vigorously asserted by the Congress and has been just as vigorously defended
against by the executive, relying almost exclusively upon the doctrine
of separation of powers.
In the past, Congress has merely asserted its right to obtain proper
information from the executive branch without attempting to enforce it. It has never attempted to invoke against executive officers
the law which provides that every person is criminally liable who,
having been summoned by either House to give testimony or to
produce papers upon a proper matter under inquiry, wilfully makes
default.
The unfortunate fact that legislative committees are not always
properly conducted, that witnesses appearing before them have less
protection than in a court of law, and that sometimes nothing is
accomplished, is no sound argument against all legislative committees any more than an unworthy occupant of a public office is an
argument for the discontinuance of that office. Thus it would seem
that both law and policy would, under proper circumstances, support
an attempt by the Congress to enforce this right.
Appendix
President

Date

George Washington

1796

Thomas Jefferson

1807

James Monroe

1825

Andrew Jackson

1833

Andrew Jackson

1835

Type of Information Refused
Instructions to U. S. Minister concerning Jay Treaty.
Confidential information and letters
relating to Burr's conspiracy.
Documents relating to conduct of
naval officers.
Copy of paper read by the President to heads of departments relating to removal of bank deposits.
Copies of charges against removed
public official. List of all appointments made without Senate's consent between 1829 and 1836, and
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John Tyler

1842

John Tyler

1843

James K. Polk

1846

Millard Fillmore

1852

James Buchanan

1860

Abraham Lincoln

1861

Ulysses S. Grant

1876

Rutherford B. Hayes

1877

Grover Cleveland

1886

Theodore Roosevelt

1909

Calvin Coolidge

1924

Herbert Hoover

1930

Herbert Hoover

1932

those receiving salaries w i t h o u t
holding office.
Names of Members of 26th and
27th Congress who had applied for
office.
Colonel Hitchcock's report to War
Department.
Evidence of payments made through
State Department on President's
certificates, by prior administration.
Official information concerning propositions made by King of Sandwich Islands to transfer same to
U. S.
Message of Protest to House against
Resolution to investigate attempts
by Executive to influence legislation.
Dispatches of Major Anderson to
the War Department concerning defense of Fort Sumter.
Information concerning executive
acts performed away from Capitol.
Secretary of Treasury refused to
answer questions and to produce
papers concerning reasons for nomination of Theodore Roosevelt as
Collector of Port of New York.
Documents relating to suspension
and removal of 650 Federal officials.
Attorney General's reasons for failure to prosecute U. S. Steel Corporation.
Documents of Bureau of Corporations, Department of Commerce.
List of companies in which Secretary of Treasury Mellon was interested.
Telegrams and letters leading up tct
London Naval Treaty.
Testimony and documents concern-
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Franklin D. Roosevelt

1941

Franklin D. Roosevelt

1943

Franklin D. Roosevelt

1943

Franklin D. Roosevelt

1943

Franklin D. Roosevelt

1943

Franklin D. Roosevelt

1944

I-arry S. Truman

1945

Harry S. Truman

1947

Harry S. Truman

1948

Harry S. Truman

1948

ing investigation made by Treasury
Department
Federal Bureau of Investigation Reports.
Director, Bureau of the Budget, refused to testify and to produce files.
Chairman, Federal Communications
Commission and Board of War
Communications refused records.
General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, refused to produce records.
Secretaries of War and Navy refused to furnish documents, and
permission for Army and Naval officers to testify.
J. Edgar Hoover refused to give
testimony and to produce President's directive.
Directions issued to heads of executive departments with regard to giving information to Pearl Harbor
Committee.
Civil Service Commission records
concerning applicants for positions.
F. B. I. letter-report on the Director of the Bureau of Standards.
Issued directive forbidding executive departments and agencies to
furnish information on reports concerning loyalty of federal employees
to any court or congressional committee unless executive approval is
given.
Directed his confidential adviser not
to testify before House Committee
on Education and Labor.
Letter of Attorney General to Chairman of investigating sub-committee
of the Senate stating that he would
not appear or furnish letters, memoranda or other notices which the
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Harry S. Truman

1950

Harry S. Truman

1952

Dwight D. Eisenhower

1954
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Department of Justice had provided
to other agencies with respect to
W. W. Remington.
Department of State loyalty files,
following vigorous opposition of J.
Edgar Hoover.
General Omar Bradley, Chief of
Staff.
Directive of President to Secretary
of State to refuse certain reports to
a Senate sub-committee.
Acting Attorney General; refusal as
to open cases but granted as to
closed cases.
Directive to Secretary of State to
withhold from Senate Appropriations sub-committee files containing
security risk information.
Directive to Defense Department
barring testimony, etc. in re: McCarthy-Army hearing, sub-committee of Senate Government Operations Committee.
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